University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
Volume 15

Issue 4

Article 5

1993

Environmental Law—Retroactive Vacature of the Mixture and
Derived-from Rules under RCRA. United States v. Goodner Bros.
Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380 (1992).
Mary Ellen Henry

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mary Ellen Henry, Environmental Law—Retroactive Vacature of the Mixture and Derived-from Rules under
RCRA. United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380 (1992)., 15 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
727 (1993).
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss4/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu.

CASENOTES
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-RETROACTIVE VACATURE OF THE
MIXTURE AND DERIVED-FROM RULES UNDER RCRA. United

States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir.
1992).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The "mixture" and "derived-from" rules have been two of the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) most fundamental hazardous waste management regulations under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 1 These rules were promulgated
by the EPA under RCRA "to close a potentially major loophole
in the hazardous waste management system." '2 The District of Columbia Circuit vacated the mixture and derived-from rules in Shell
1. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92
(1988) (as amended) [hereinafter RCRAJ. The RCRA regulation known as the
"mixture rule" is in relevant part: (iv) It is a mixture of solid waste and one or
more hazardous wastes listed in subpart D of this part and has not been excluded
from paragraph (a)(2) of this section under §§ 260.20 and 260.22 of this chapter;
40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(iv) (1992). The "derived-from rule" is in relevant part:
(2)(i) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this section, any solid
waste generated from the treatment, storage, or disposal of a hazardous waste,
including any sludge, spill residue, ash, emission control dust, or leachate (but not
including precipitation run-off) is a hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(2)(i)
(1992). These rules preempt dilution and inadequate treatment from being used to
meet the strict requirements for hazardous waste treatment and disposal.
Opponents have criticized the rules for being too inclusive; that is, the rules can
define waste as hazardous even if it contains very low concentrations of hazardous
chemicals. However, proponents have supported the rules for preventing abuse of
dilution as hazardous waste treatment, for preventing use of inadequate treatment
technologies, and for encouraging waste minimization. See generally James C.
Morriss III & Cheryl L. Coon, Who's on First, What's on Second, Or a Discussion
of the Scope and Potential Misuse of the "Mixture" and "Derived-From" Rules
and "Contained-In" Policy, 44 Sw. L.J. 1531 (1991).
2. According to the EPA:
Without a "mixture" rule, generators of hazardous waste could perhaps
evade regulatory requirements by mixing hazardous waste with non-hazardous waste and (claim] that the mixture was no longer hazardous, even
though it poses environmental hazards. Without a "derived-from" rule,
owners and operators of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities could
perhaps evade regulation by minimally processing a hazardous waste and
claiming that the residue was no longer hazardous.
57 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261).
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Oil v. EPA3 because the rules had not been promulgated with
sufficient notice and opportunity for comment.4 The District of
Columbia Circuit did not state whether its decision was retroactive
or prospective.' In United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc. ,6
an Arkansas case, the Eighth Circuit applied the District of Columbia
Circuit's decision in Shell Oil v. EPA7 retroactively, invalidating
convictions for RCRA violations that were partially based on these
rules.' The Eighth Circuit declined to reach the federal government's
argument that Arkansas's own environmental regulations, 9 which
incorporate the federal mixture and derived-from rules by reference,' 0
would support the invalidated convictions because charges were
brought under federal law only." Thus, the Eighth Circuit left open
the question of whether the Arkansas rules that adopted by reference
the subsequently vacated federal rules are valid, and ultimately,
whether generators remain liable for pre-Shell Oil enforcement actions
based on states' potentially flawed mixture and derived-from rules.
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF THE MIXTURE AND DERIVEDFROM RULES

In RCRA,' 2 subtitle C,'3 Congress required the EPA to promulgate regulations "as may be necessary to protect human health
and the environment" covering generators, transporters, treaters,
storers, and disposers of hazardous waste,14 and which would regulate
3. Shell Oil v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
4. Id. at 752.
5. See United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992).
See generally Jon Hanke, The Mixture/Derived-From Fallout Begins, El DIGEST,
July 1992, at 17.
6. 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992).
7. 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
8. Goodner Bros., 966 F.2d at 385. The EPA maintains that the mixture and
derived-from rules were vacated prospectively only: "[T]he Agency believes that
the Shell Oil decision is not intended to be retroactive" because the District of
Columbia Circuit's concern about regulatory discontinuity is inconsistent with an
interpretation of its decision that retroactively voided the rules. 57 Fed. Reg. 7628,
7630-31 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261).
9. ARK. HAZ.

WASTE

MAN.

CODE

(1980) (promulgated pursuant to the Arkansas

Hazardous Waste Management Act, 1979 Ark. Acts 406).
10. Id. § 3(a)(2).
11. Goodner Bros., 966 F.2d at 385.
12. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3001, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92
(1988).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-34 (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-24 (1988). A "generator" is anyone whose act or process
produces hazardous waste. Id. § 6903(6). "Storage" means containment of hazardous
waste in such a manner as to not constitute disposal. Id. § 6903(33). "Treatment"
includes any activity or process designed to change the physical form or chemical
composition of a hazardous waste so as to render it nonhazardous. Id. § 6903(34).
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hazardous waste from "cradle to grave. ' "'

Fundamental to this

requirement was the EPA's development of "criteria for identifying

the characteristics of hazardous waste 16 and for listing hazardous
waste ...

taking into account toxicity, persistence, and degradability

in nature, potential for accumulation in tissue, and other related
factors such as flammability, corrosiveness, and other hazardous
7

characteristics." 1

In 1980, the EPA finalized regulations" that defined four cat-

egories of hazardous waste: (1) materials that are hazardous by
physical characteristic, 19 (2) materials that are specifically listed as

hazardous wastes due to their origin, 20 (3) materials that are mixtures
of specifically listed hazardous wastes and other solid waste, 21 and
(4) materials that are the residues from treatment of specifically
listed hazardous wastes. 22 The last two categories are known, re15. "From cradle to grave" is a phrase coined by EPA meaning hazardous
waste management regulation is designed to manage hazardous waste from the
point of generation to the point of disposal. See Randolph L. Hill, An Overview
of RCRA: The "Mind-Numbing" Provisions of the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,254, 10,261 (1991).
16. Congress defined hazardous waste as:
[Slolid waste ... which, because of its quantity, concentration, or physical,
chemical, or infectious characteristics may ... cause, or significantly

contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible,
or incapacitating reversible, illness; or pose a substantial present or potential
hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (1988).
18. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,095-96 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261).
See also 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946-59,022 (1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 250)
(proposed Dec. 18, 1978).
19. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(i) (1992). These characteristics are: ignitability (will
burn easily and/or spontaneously), reactivity (will chemically and/or physically react
spontaneously or when exposed to water or air), corrosivity (aqueous with pH less
than or equal to 2 or greater than or equal to 12.5, or will corrode metal under
certain conditions), and toxicity (material leaches toxic chemicals above maximum
allowable concentrations). See generally 40 C.F.R. § 261.20-24, subpart C (1992)
which provides the characteristics of hazardous waste.
20. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(ii) (1992). Listed wastes are grouped in the following
ways: Wastes that are chemically similar from nonspecific sources, e.g., chlorinated
phenolic organics like pentachlorophenol is F032. Id. § 261.31 (hazardous waste
from nonspecific sources). Wastes from specific sources, e.g., bottom sediment
sludge from treatment of wastewaters from wood preserving processes that use
pentachlorophenol is K002. Id. § 261.32 (hazardous waste from specific sources).
Waste can also be "off-spec" product, or discarded or unused formulations of
otherwise "clean" chemical products (P and U listed wastes). Id. § 261.33.
21. Id. § 261.3(a)(2)(iv).
22. Id. § 261.3(c)(2)(i).
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spectively, as the "mixture rule" and "derived-from rule." 2 3 These
rules define mixtures including hazardous waste or waste residues
derived from treatment of hazardous waste as hazardous wastes,
24
regardless of hazardous constituent concentration.
The EPA promulgated the mixture rule25 in response to the
potential for industry to simply dilute its hazardous wastes with
other nonhazardous solid waste to reduce the concentration of toxic
materials, 26 thereby avoiding the intent of Congress that generation
of hazardous waste be minimized and as much waste as possible be
destroyed: "[D]ilution of wastes by the addition of other hazardous
wastes or any other materials during waste . . . treatment ... is
not . . . acceptable ... to reduce the concentration of hazardous

constituents.' '27
Similarly, the EPA promulgated the derived-from rule 28 to prevent industry from using inadequate "treatment" processes that
would not actually destroy the hazardous chemical or immobilize
the hazardous metal, again promoting the complete destruction and
29
minimization of hazardous waste.
23. 57 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261).
24. Id. See generally Morriss & Coon, supra note 1.
25. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,095 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261).
26. Id. Regarding the mixture rule specifically, EPA requires wastes to be treated
so that only a certain concentration of the chemical remains in the waste before
the waste can be disposed of in a hazardous waste landfill (called "landban
standards"). The landban concentration-based standard for benzene (as listed waste
U019, 40 C.F.R. § 261.33) (1992) is only thirty-six milligrams of benzene per one
kilogram of waste (expressed as thirty-six parts per million or 36 ppm). 40 C.F.R.
§ 268.43 (1992) (table CCW for non-wastewaters). Thus, after treatment, only thirtysix milligrams of benzene can remain in the one kilogram of waste. If one were
allowed to dilute, then one could take thirty-six milligrams of pure benzene and
simply add it to one kilogram of dirt. Thus, the landban concentration would be
met but no benzene was destroyed. Congress intended for waste to be destroyed.

See 40 C.F.R. § 268.42 (1992) (listing preferred destruction technologies specific to
each listed waste). See also Morriss & Coon, supra note 1.
27. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 976 F.2d 2 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(quoting the Senate Committee Report, RCRA 1984 Amendment, at 17).
28. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,095-96 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261).
29. For a comprehensive discussion of the mixture and derived-from rules, see
Jeffrey M. Gaba, The Mixture and Derived-From Rules under RCRA: Once a
Hazardous Waste, Always a Hazardous Waste? 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,033 (1991) (containing a comprehensive discussion of the mixture and derivedfrom rules). There is an exception to the rule that "once a hazardous waste, always
a hazardous waste." Hazardous wastes can be removed from hazardous waste
regulation through the regulatory process of "delisting." Hazardous wastes that
have been treated properly or that, even without treatment, carry the hazardous
waste listing despite its nonhazardous nature, can be removed from subtitle C of
RCRA (into subtitle D to be regarded as waste, though no longer hazardous) by
the delisting process. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 260.20, 260.22 (1992). A generator may
obtain reclassification by submitting an acceptable delisting petition to EPA. An
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III.

DEMISE OF THE MIXTURE AND DERIVED-FROM

RULES: SHELL

OL Co. v. EPA
A.

Introduction

In Shell Oil,30 the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
EPA violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) 31 by failing
to give sufficient notice and opportunity for comment in promulgating
the mixture and derived-from rules. 32 The court reasoned that the
EPA's mixture and derived-from rules in the final hazardous waste
management rules under RCRA were not a "logical outgrowth" of
the proposed rules because they had no precursor in the proposed
rules.33 The District of Columbia Circuit found the addition of these
rules created a fundamental change, resulting in deviations between
the proposed and the final rules that were too sharp.3 4 Thus, the
public was denied adequate notice and opportunity for comment in
violation of APA requirements.35 For these procedural reasons only,
the court vacated and remanded the rules back to the EPA, leaving
open the question of whether the ten-year-old rules were void
prospectively or retroactively .36
B.

The Decision: Clarification of Public Comment Requirements
Under the APA

The EPA is required to offer adequate opportunity for public
37
comment of proposed regulations prior to promulgating final rules.
As the court in Shell Oil stated,
acceptable petition generally requires comprehensive laboratory analysis, descriptions
of the source and amount of waste, and a plan to continue testing to ensure waste
remains the same as that delisted by EPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 260.22 (1992).

30. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988). See also Solid Waste Disposal Act, § 7004(b), 42
U.S.C. § 6974(b) (1988).
32. Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 752. See also 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,095-96 (1980)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.3) (Identification of Hazardous Wastes, Final
Rule). Adequate notice and comment under the APA is discussed in text accompanying note 36.
33. 950 F.2d at 752.
34. Id. at 751-52.
35. Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988). See also Solid Waste Disposal Act,
§ 7004(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b) (1988).
36. 950 F.2d at 752.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (1988). "[Tlhe [EPA] Administrator shall, after notice
and opportunity for public hearing, and after consultation with appropriate federal
and state agencies, develop and promulgate criteria for identifying the characteristics
of hazardous waste, and for listing hazardous waste." Id.
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The relationship between the proposed regulation and the
final rule determines the adequacy of notice. A difference between
the two will not invalidate the notice so long as the final rule
is a "logical outgrowth" of the one proposed. If the deviation
from the proposal is too sharp, the affected parties will not have
had adequate notice and opportunity for comment. 8

1.

The Difference Between the Proposed and Final Rules
Was Too Sharp

The District of Columbia Circuit held that there was a
fundamental difference between the proposed and final rules that
was too sharp. In the proposed regulations, 9 the EPA first attempted
to classify hazardous waste by any of nine characteristics, but decided
that only four could be practically determined. 40 Thus, waste
representing the remaining five characteristics had to be listed
specifically, and "any waste once listed [had to be treated] as
hazardous until a person managing the waste filed a delisting petition
and demonstrated to the EPA that the waste did not pose a hazard." ' 4
However, in the final rule, as a response to several comments
''concerning waste mixtures and when hazardous wastes become
subject to and cease to be subject to the subtitle C hazardous waste
management system," 4 the EPA broadened the definition of hazardous
waste by adding two new definitions: A waste was also hazardous
if it was "a mixture of solid waste and one or more hazardous
wastes listed . . . and [had] not been excluded ' 43 or if it was a
"solid waste generated from the treatment, storage, or disposal of
38. 950 F.2d at 747.
39. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,950, 58,955-57 (1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 250.11 (b)(3)) (proposed Dec. 18, 1978).

40. 950 F.2d at 748 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 58,950, 58,955-57 (1978) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 250) (proposed Dec. 18, 1978)). The EPA intended generators to
be given widely available and uncomplicated test methods for determining whether
their wastes were characteristic. Only the four characteristics of ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity could be practically determined and so were designated as characteristics. The remaining six characteristics that could not be practically
determined included organic toxicity, carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, teratogenicity,
bioaccumulation potential, and phytotoxicity. The EPA considered the available
technology regarding these characteristics too insufficiently developed or required
such skilled personnel as to render them impractical for wide spread use. Thus,
these six characteristics were blanketly addressed by the listing process. See 45 Fed.
Reg. 33,105 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261).
41. 950 F.2d at 748 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946, 58,959-60 (1978) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261)) (proposed Dec. 18, 1978).
42. Id. at 749 (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,095 (1980) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 261)).
43. Id. (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 33,119 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.3)).
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a hazardous waste."
45
respectively.

44

2.

These are the mixture and derived-from rules,

Clear Intent Does Not Make A Difference

The District of Columbia Circuit did not endorse the EPA's
argument that its intent was clear and that the mixture rule was
implicit in the proposed rule. 46 The court responded that an
unexpressed intention cannot convert a final rule into a "logical
outgrowth" of the proposed regulation that the public should have
anticipated, so as to satisfy the notice and comment requirements
of the APA. 47 Although the public could have anticipated the potential
for evading the regulations by simply mixing nonhazardous waste
with hazardous waste, "it [was] the business of the EPA, and not
the public, to foresee that possibility and to address it in its proposed
regulations.' '48 The court then stated that even if the mixture and
derived-from rules promulgated by the EPA had been anticipated,
comments by members of the public would not in and of themselves
49
constitute adequate notice for purposes of the APA.
The court stated that the addition of the mixture and derivedfrom rules to the final hazardous waste management rule created
a fundamental difference between the proposed and final rule.50 In
the proposed rule, the listing5' of hazardous waste was only to play
a "supplemental function" of increasing the certainty of the process,
52
while in the final rule, the listing was more heavily emphasized.
The proposed rule defined waste as hazardous if it exhibited one
of nine hazardous characteristics, while the final rule defined hazardous
as (1) any waste that exhibited one of four hazardous characteristics;
(2) any waste included on a list regardless of hazardous characteristics;
or (3) any waste generated from the treatment, storage, or disposal
44. Id. at 750 (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,120 (1980) (to be codified at

40 C.F.R. pt. 261)).
45. See supra text accompanying note 1.
46. 950 F.2d at 751.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Id. "Under the standards of the APA, 'notice necessarily must come

-

if

at all - from the Agency.' " Id. (quoting Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Taskforce
v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
50. Id. at 751-52.
51. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(ii) (1992). See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-35,

subpart D (1992) for lists of hazardous wastes.
52. 950 F.2d at 751-52 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,106 (1980) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261)).
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activities of hazardous waste, regardless of hazardous characteristics."
In the proposed rule, the waste was no longer hazardous if it failed
to exhibit one of the nine hazardous characteristics, while in the
final rule the waste remained hazardous until it was "formally
removed from the list" by the delisting process.5 4 Thus, the proposed
rule required hazardous waste to actually be hazardous, while the
final rule did not.5 5 The court saw this shift as a fundamental change
which prevented the final rule from being a "logical outgrowth"
5
of the proposed rule.

C.

6

Significance in Relation to Goodner Bros.

In Shell Oil, the District of Columbia Circuit Court did not
discuss whether the vacated rules were to be vacated prospectively
only or retroactively. This opened the door for any defendant charged
with a RCRA violation based on either the mixture rule or derivedfrom rule to claim the rule void, which would effectively nullify
the unlawful act. The Eighth Circuit was the first forum 57 to test
53. Id. at 748-49 (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 33,119, 33,120 (1980) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2))).
54. Id. at 752. The greater significance of "listing" under the mixture rule is
apparent by the following illustration. Under the final rule's mixture provision, if
a drop of a liquid that has been listed as a hazardous waste is mixed with a 20,000
gallon tank filled with water, then the tank of water becomes hazardous waste by
rule. In the proposed rule that does not contain this mixture rule, however, the
classification of the tank of water with the one drop of listed waste is not known
until it is tested and determined analytically that the mixture does not possess one
of the nine hazardous characteristics (one drop of hazardous waste in a tank full
of clean water would probably not be enough to make the water hazardous, i.e.,
to cause the mixture to exhibit any of the nine hazardous characteristics; thus, the
mixture would probably not be hazardous under the proposed rule). But under the
final rule, the mixture is hazardous by rule regardless of the absence of hazardous
characteristics. Furthermore, the. water would reman "hazardous" under RCRA
until it was "delisted." See generally Gaba, supra note 29. Due to this difference
between the proposed and final rules, the court decided that commentators (the
public) must have the opportunity to comment on the distinction. 950 F.2d at 752.
55. 950 F.2d at 752.
As a consequence, the final criteria for listing are considerably expanded
and more specific than those proposed. . . . [Tihis shift . . . erodes the
foundation of the EPA's argument that the mixture rule was implicit in
the proposed regulations. A system that would rely primarily on lists of
wastes . . . might imply inclusion of a waste until it is formally removed
from the list. The proposed regulations, however, did not suggest such a
system. Rather, their emphasis on characteristics suggested that if a waste
did not exhibit the nine characteristics originally proposed, it need not be
regulated as hazardous. We conclude, therefore, that the mixture rule was
neither implicit in nor a "logical outgrowth" of the proposed regulations.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Hanke, supra note 5, at 17.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

19931
this argument
Eighth Circuit
illegal disposal
application of

IV.

in United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft.5 8 The
based its decision to invalidate the convictions for
of hazardous waste or waste mixtures on a retroactive
Shell Oil.59

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SHELL OIL IN THE EIGHTH

CIRCUIT: UNITED STATES V. GOODNER BROS.

A.

AIRCRAFT

Introduction

The Eighth Circuit's decision in Goodner Bros.6° was the first
retroactive application of the District of Columbia Circuit's Shell
Oil decision to vacate the mixture and derived-from rules. 6' Goodner
Brothers was charged with disposing of hazardous waste in violation
of RCRA. 62 The waste was designated as hazardous either by its
RCRA listing or because it was a hazardous waste mixture. 63 The
Eighth Circuit's decision to retroactively apply Shell Oil removed
the federal mixture rule, which was relied upon as a partial basis
for the convictions by the jury in the trial court,6 even though the
RCRA violations took place prior to the Shell Oil decision when
the original federal mixture rule was in effect. The Eighth Circuit
remanded Goodner Bros. in part to the trial court to retry these
convictions without reliance on the mixture rule. 65 However, the
Eighth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether Arkansas mixture
and derived-from rules, which adopted the federal rules by reference,
were rendered invalid. 66 The decision thus leaves the status of states'
mixture and derived-from rules uncertain, possibly removing the basis
for state RCRA and perhaps, even Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 67 enforcement
actions based on the states' equivalent rules.
58. United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992).
59. Id. at 385.
60. Id. at 380.
61. Hanke, supra note 5, at 17.
62. 966 F.2d at 382-83.
63. Id. at 383-84, 386.
64. Id. at 385. Only the mixture rule was discussed in Goodner Bros., though
this decision retroactively applies Shell Oil, which vacated both the mixture and
derived-from rules. See Shell Oil, 950 F.2d at 752.
65. 966 F.2d at 385.
66. Id.
67. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988) (as amended).
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The Facts

Goodner Brothers Aircraft was an aircraft repainting business,
owned and operated by Junior Goodner.6 The operation involved
spraying airplanes with pure solvent (paint removers) to dissolve old
paint and high pressure water to knock off remaining paint, and
then repainting them with fresh paint. 69 The solvents used in this
process were approximately fifty to seventy percent methylene chloride,
with a smaller amount of phenol. 70 The waste generated from this
process was collected and disposed of by dumping it into two ravines
and one man-made excavation at the Goodner Brothers Farm. 71 An
estimated total amount of twenty-five tons was disposed of in this
72
manner over a period of approximately eight years.
In 1988, a neighbor witnessed one waste-dumping event and
reported seeing "two men dumping creamy beige, toxic-smelling waste
into a ravine. ' 73 Junior Goodner reassured the neighbor that there
was nothing with which to be concerned. The neighbor, however,
reported the incident to the "authorities," resulting in an investigation
by both the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology
74
(ADPC&E) and the EPA Region Six.
Under a warrant, the EPA seized documents, including an EPA
letter dated 1980 and an ADPC&E letter dated 1982, warning Goodner
Brothers of potential liability for hazardous substances. 75 The EPA
also took direct samples of the waste as it fell from a solventsprayed airplane and it also took samples from the dump site. 76 The
EPA determined through testing that the dump site samples contained
up to twenty percent phenol and twenty percent methylene chloride. 77
C.

The Charges

Junior Goodner and Goodner Brothers Aircraft were charged
with violations of both RCRA and CERCLA. 7s The case was tried
68. 966 F.2d at 382.
69. Id.
70. Id.

71. Id.at 383.
72. Id. at 382-83. The opinion specifically states that dumping activities occurred
in 1988, but also states that Goodner Brothers Aircraft received warning letters
dated 1980 and 1982 from the EPA and the Arkansas Department of Pollution
Control and Ecology (ADPC&E), respectively. Id. at 383.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

77. Id.These chemicals are both RCRA hazardous substances listed in 40 C.F.R.
pt. 261 app. VIII (1992).
78. 966 F.2d at 382.
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twice and went to the Eighth Circuit on appeal of the second trial
convictions.7 9 In the second trial, Goodner Brothers was convicted
of RCRA counts one through four, the disposal of hazardous waste
without having obtained a permit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 6925
and 6926 in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). 0 Both Goodner
Brothers and Junior Goodner were convicted of count nine, the
handling of hazardous waste and failing to file an application for
a hazardous waste permit in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(4). 8 '
Junior Goodner was convicted of counts six through eight, CERCLA
violations involving the release of hazardous substances into the
82
environment without a permit, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b).
The Goodner Bros. appellate court date was set for December
11, 1991.81 The appeal was complicated by the District of Columbia
Circuit's Shell Oil decision which was handed down on December
6, 1991, s4 because Shell Oil vacated the federal mixture rule, which
served in part as the basis for the convictions that Goodner Brothers

was appealing."5
D.

The Decision: Presumptive Retroactive Application of Shell
Oil
In Goodner Bros., the Eighth Circuit applied Shell Oil
retroactively, thus partially removing the federal mixture rule from
79. Id.
80. Id. at 383.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Additional Brief for Appellee at 2, United States v. Goodner Bros.
Aircraft, 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-2466).
84. Id. The briefs for Goodner Brothers Aircraft were filed by November 11,
1991. However, Shell Oil was decided on December 6, 1991, five days before the
December 11, 1991 trial date, prompting the Eighth Circuit to request additional
briefs addressing the effect of Shell Oil on the case. Id.
85. Id. The Government filed a supplemental brief on January 13, 1992, addressing the effect of Shell Oil on the Goodner Bros. appeal. Id. In the supplemental
brief, the Government argued that the convictions not relying on the mixture rule
should immediately be affirmed and the decision regarding the convictions relying
in part on the mixture rule (counts one through four and count nine) should be
held in abeyance until the District of Columbia Circuit had been given the opportunity to respond to several motions before it, one of which was by the
Government as appellee in Goodner Bros. that could have clarified its decision in
Shell Oil. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit denied the Government's appellee
motion for clarification without comment on March 5, 1992. Subsequently, the
circuit court issued its Shell Oil mandate without further elaboration. Id. In its
supplemental brief, the Government proposed that, in the absence of a District of
Columbia Circuit Court clarification of the Shell Oil decision, the Eighth Circuit
could either remand counts one through four to the district court for initial
consideration of the issue or it could itself decide the i1upact of Shell Oil. Id. The
Government then offered an Additional Brief to clarify the arguments arising from
the possibility that the Eighth Circuit would decide this case and not remand it
to the trial court. Id.
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consideration as the basis for the convictions on appeal. 86 The Eighth
Circuit then remanded these convictions back to the trial court for
retrial without the federal mixture rule.17 The court specifically declined
to reach the question of the validity of the Arkansas mixture rule
because the charges were brought under the federal mixture rule
88
only.
1.

The Original Conviction Was Partially Based on the
Mixture Rule

The original conviction was partially based on the mixture rule
that had been vacated in Shell Oil. If an original conviction is based
in part on a rule that is no longer in effect, and it is impossible
to determine which basis the jury used to convict, then, as a matter
of common law, the conviction cannot stand. 89 Therefore, because
the jury may have relied on the mixture rule for convictions one
through four and nine, the Eighth Circuit's retroactive application
of Shell Oil in Goodner Bros. invalidated the convictions.9
To support the convictions in Goodner Brothers Aircraft's second
trial, the jury had to find that the waste dumped by Goodner Brothers
was hazardous. 91 Under the instructions provided, 92 the jury could
have determined the waste was hazardous either because it was listed
waste 93 or because it was a mixture of listed waste and nonhazardous
solid waste. 94 Referring to the District of Columbia Circuit's
86. Goodner Bros., 966 F.2d at 385.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 384 (quoting Griffin v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 466, 474 (1991)).
90. Id. at 385.
91. Id. Appellants were convicted of "knowingly treat[ing], stor[ingl, or dispos[ing] of any hazardous waste identified or listed under [RCRA subchapter D]
... without ... a permit." 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (1988).
92. 966 F.2d at 383-84. The jury was to determine whether the waste disposed
of was hazardous by jury instruction number nine, and further defined in instruction

number eleven:
You are instructed that the [EPA] has listed as hazardous the following
wastes:
The spent halogenated solvent, methylene chloride, and all spent solvent
mixture and/or blends containing, before their use, a total of ten percent
or more by volume of methylene chloride.
You are further instructed that pursuant to the regulations of the [EPA]
and the [ADPC&E], when a listed hazardous waste is mixed with a solid,
liquid, or semisolid material, the resulting mixture is also a hazardous
waste.

Id.
93. Under 40 C.F.R. § 261.31 (1992), the waste is listed as F002, "ignitable
spent halogenated solvents"
94. Definition (2) is the mixture rule. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(iv) (1992). See
supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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invalidation of the mixture rule in Shell Oil,91 the Eighth Circuit
stated that if a jury verdict were based in part on valid grounds,
here the specific waste listing, and in part on grounds that were
unconstitutional or illegal, here the mixture rule definition of hazardous
waste, 96 and if it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected,
"then the verdict must be set aside." 97 Because it was impossible
to determine whether the jury's verdict was based on the EPA's
mixture rule or the listing of the waste, the Eighth Circuit set aside
convictions one through four and conviction nine. 9
2.

Despite Apparent Concern of Potential Discontinuity,
"Vacate" Means "Vacate!"

To preserve the mixture rule as a basis for the Goodner Brothers
Aircraft convictions (one through four and nine), the Government
argued that the District of Columbia Circuit did not intend to vacate
the mixture and derived-from rules retroactively, but only
prospectively. 99 The Government cited as support the District of
Columbia Circuit's expressed concern regarding potential discontinuity
in the regulations.' °0 The Government claimed that the District of
Columbia Circuit's suggestion that the EPA reissue an immediate
final replacement for the mixture and derived-from rules under the
"good cause" allowance of the APA was inconsistent with a retroactive
ruling that would create discontinuity.' 0' The Government reasoned
95. 966 F.2d at 384 (citing Shell Oil v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 752 (D.C. Cir.
1991)).
96. Id. at 384. Even though the jury instructions list both "EPA and the
ADPC&E," the Arkansas mixture rule was not the basis for the conviction. Id.
at 385.
97. Id. (quoting Griffin v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 466, 474 (1991)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 384.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Government reasoned that the District of Columbia Circuit Court
did not intend for the invalidation of the rules to disrupt RCRA enforcement and
that the court was aware of the potential impact on the regulation of hazardous
waste caused by the inevitable discontinuity that would result from the invalidation
of the mixture rule. Additional Brief for Appellee at 3-4, United States v. Goodner
Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d 380, 384 (8th Cir. 1992) (No. 91-2466). Thus, the Government argued, the court in Shell Oil suggested that the EPA propose reenacting
the rules on an interim basis, making it clear that the court intended the EPA's
reenactment of the rule to allow the rule's continuous effect. Additional Brief for
Appellee at 3-4. The Interim Rules were issued at 57 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1992) under
the "good cause" exemption of 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(8) (1988). See Shell Oil, 950
at 752. A retroactive application of Shell Oil would have been inconsistent with
the court's apparent concern about discontinuity. Thus, if the rules were void "ab
initio," as the appellant claimed, then the interim rule would be the first to exist,
thus, leading to discontinuity. Therefore, according to the Government, the rule
could not have been void ab initio. Additional Brief for Appellee at 3-4.
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that the reissuance of the mixture and derived-from rules would not
avoid discontinuity in the regulations if the District of Columbia
Circuit's decision was retroactive because the reissued rule would be
prospective only. 10 2 In other words, a retroactive application of Shell
Oil would eliminate the mixture and derived-from rules from 1980
until Shell Oil, while the reissuance of the rules would perpetuate
the rules after, but not before, Shell Oil. The Government argued
that the District of Columbia Circuit intended to avoid this
discontinuity by first, leaving the previous federal mixture and derivedfrom rules in place until Shell Oil, and second, by allowing the
EPA to reissue the mixture and derived-from rules on an interim
basis pending full notice and comment prior to actual vacature by
the District of Columbia Circuit. 10 3 The Government argued that the
District of Columbia Circuit's intent was for the EPA to cure the
procedural inadequacies of the original mixture and derived-from
rules' promulgation procedures without the discontinuity that would
be caused by a retroactive vacature of the rules.'04
The Eighth Circuit responded by first clarifying its interpretation
of the language used by the District of Columbia Circuit in Shell
Oil, stating that the words the District of Columbia Circuit used,
"vacate" and "remand," were inconsistent with a prospective
application of its ruling. 05 The Eighth Circuit cited previous District
of Columbia Circuit usage of "vacate" as meaning "to annul; to
cancel or rescind; to declare, to make, or to render void; to defeat;
to deprive of force; to make of no authority or validity; to set
aside.'"°6
The Eighth Circuit then discounted the Government's reliance
on the District of Columbia Circuit's apparent concern for potential
"discontinuity" resulting from the vacature of the rule, stating that
the District of Columbia Circuit's choice of language "could easily
refer to the practical effect of invalidation of the mixture [sic) with
respect to the compliance practices of the regulated industries rather
'0 7
than referring to the legal force of the mixture rule.'
3.

Presumption of Retroactivity: James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia

In another attempt to avoid the retroactive application of Shell
Oil and to preserve the mixture rule as the basis for the Goodner
102. Additional Brief for Appellee at 5 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1989)).
103. Id. at 4-5.
104. Id.
105. Goodner Bros., 966 F.2d at 384-85.
106. Id. at 384. (citing Action on Smoking & Health v. C.A.B., 713 F.2d 795,
797 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
107. Id. at 384-85.
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Brothers Aircraft convictions, the Government showed how the District
of Columbia Circuit could easily have left the rules in place with
a solely prospective decision. 08 The Government provided many
examples of rules promulgated in violation of the APA that were
left in place, of which a significant number concerned the public
health and safety.' °9
The Government then applied the three part test of Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson to justify its conclusion that Shell Oil should be
applied prospectively only." 0 Under the Chevron Oil test, a decision
should be applied prospectively if a retroactive application would:

(1)establish a new principle of law, including overruling clear past
precedent; (2) further retard the operation of the rule in question;
and (3) pose unacceptable inequity."' In applying the Chevron Oil
test, the Government recognized that a retroactive application would
overrule ten years of precedent beginning when the mixture rule was
promulgated in 1980.112 The Government next recognized that the

rule performed a valuable function in preventing dilution as treatment
108. Additional Brief for Appellee at 6. The District of Columbia Circuit had
"equitable power to render such a prospective decision. It is a well-settled principle
of administrative law that federal courts have the authority to leave administrative
rules or decisions in place even if the agency did not satisfy all of the requirements
of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553." Id. (citing Rodway v. United States Dep't of Agric.,
514 F.2d 809, 817-18 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). The Government argued that the practice
of allowing rules to remain in effect predates the APA, (see e.g., Addition v.
Holly Hill Fruit Prods., 322 U.S. 607, 618-23 (1944)) and that nothing in the APA
limits this authority. Id. See also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988) (judicial review under the
APA).
109. Additional Brief for Appellee at 7 (citing among others Fertilizer Inst. v.
EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding rule despite no notice and
comment); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 236 (5th Cir. 1989)
(upholding Clean Water Act standard despite no notice and comment)).
110. Id. at 8 (citing Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)). The District
of Columbia Circuit "has counseled agencies to consider [this] test when they
interpret [D.C. Circuit] court decisions." Id. at 8 n.6 (citing American Gas Ass'n
v. FERC, 888 F.2d 136, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
111. Id. (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971)). "First,
the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law,
[for example] overruling clear past precedent." Id. (quoting Chevron Oil, 404 U.S.
at 106). Second, the Court would "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by
looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and
whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Id. (quoting
Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629
(1965)) (Fourth Amendment decision not applied retroactively)). Finally, the Court
would weigh "the inequity imposed by retroactive application...." Id. (quoting
Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107).
112. Id. at 9. Retroactive application of ruling would clearly overrule past
precedent because the mixture rule has been a fundamental part of RCRA enforcement since its promulgation. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1992).
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and had not been struck down for substantive reasons."' Finally,
the Government argued that gross inequities would arise from a
4
retroactive application."

In response to the Government's application of Chevron Oil,
the Eighth Circuit cited the more recent Supreme Court decision of
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia."' James B. Beam Distilling
Co. limits the application of the three-part Chevron Oil test and
6
provides that full retroactivity is the normal rule in civil cases."
The Eighth Circuit interpreted James B. Beam Distilling Co. to mean
that "full retroactive effect must be given to a new rule of civil
law when the new rule is applied to the litigants in the case in
which the rule was announced."" 7 Further, the Eighth Circuit observed
that "the court in Shell Oil did not expressly reserve the question
of retroactivity or of whether its holding should apply to the parties
before it," but instead "declined to reach the substantive arguments
... regarding the mixture rule because it had vacated [it]. '"118 The
Eighth Circuit concluded that the court in Shell Oil applied the
invalidation of the mixture rule to the parties before it because it
otherwise would have been required to meet the substantive

arguments." 9 Then, "[u]nder James B. Beam Distilling Co. and
consistent with the meaning of the word 'vacate,' "the Eighth Circuit
found that the invalidation of the mixture rule applied retroactively. 20
113. Additional Brief for Appellee at 9. The rule performed a valuable function
in preventing the indiscriminate dilution of hazardous waste with nonhazardous
solid waste in order to reduce concentrations below the treatment standards without
treatment by destruction of the waste constituent of concern, thus, "closing a major
loophole." Id. (quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,095 (1980) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. § 261.3)). The Government pointed out that the rule was struck down only
on procedural grounds, and no defect was found for substantive reasons. Id.at
10. The Government also pointed out that the District of Columbia Circuit had
found the mixture rule "eminently reasonable" in Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Id.
114. Id. The Government argued that a retroactive application of Shell Oil would
have "rewarded those who did not comply with a presumptively valid regulation
that had been in place for ten years. Because law-abiding waste generators have
long complied with the mixture rule and conformed their activities to the rule's
requirements, no inequities arise from applying the decision prospectively only."
Id.at 10-11.
115. Goodner Bros., 966 F.2d at 385 (citing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2445-46 (1991)). See also Appellants' Response to Appellee's Additional Brief at 8-10, United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft (8th Cir.
1992) (No. 91-2466).
116. 966 F.2d at 385.
117. Id. (citing Boudreau v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 942 F.2d 497, 498 n.1
(8th Cir. 1991)).
118. Id.
119. Id.

120. Id.
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Finally, due to the possibility of the jury's reliance on the retroactively
vacated federal mixture rule, the Eighth Circuit remanded counts
one through four and count nine for retrial without the federal
2
mixture rule.' '
V.

GOODNER'S EFFECT ON STATES'

MIXTURE AND DERIVED-FROM

RULES

Under RCRA, EPA is required to assist the states in developing
hazardous waste management regulations minimally equivalent to
the federal rules and eventually, authorize each state to enforce
RCRA within its boundaries.' 2 Many states adopted rules equivalent
to the federal rules. 123 In adopting the required rules, many states
used a streamlined approach that did not provide public notice and
comment, relying instead on the adequacy of the federal promulgation
procedures. l 2 Thus, the vacature of the federal rules due to lack
of adequate notice and comment brings into particular question the
validity of these state rules that were adopted in this abbreviated
manner. 25 Doubts have also been raised about the validity of the
state rules that used the resource conserving method of incorporating
the federal rules by reference. 126 Because the Eighth Circuit expressly
declined to address the Arkansas mixture and derived-from rules in
Goodner Bros. ,127 the status of the Arkansas rules, and any other
state's rules, is debatable. Two issues arise: (1) Did the subsequent
vacature and immediate reenactment of the federal rule affect the
states' rules that incorporated the federal rules by reference? (2) On
the other hand, assuming that the federal rule was void ab initio,
did the states' adoption of a void rule automatically make void the
128
adopting rule?
A.

States' "Incorporation By Reference"

The validity of a state's mixture and derived-from rules may
depend on the intent of the legislature or administrative body in
121. Id.

122. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988).
123. See Stephen C. Jones, Shell Oil May Tie Enforcers' Hands, NAT'L L.J.,
October 19, 1992, at 18.
124. Jones, supra note 123, at 20.
125. Jones, supra note 123, at 20, 22.
126. Jones, supra note 123, at 18.
127. 966 F.2d at 385.
128. This discussion assumes that statutes and regulations are treated analogously
for the purposes of administrative procedure regarding adoption and incorporation
by reference.
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adopting the regulations and on whether or not the administrative
body fulfilled all the standard state notice and comment requirements
in adopting the regulations.
Generally, the effect of a subsequent modification or appeal of
an adopted statute on the adopting statute is a matter of legislative
intent. 29 In the absence of any language indicating a different
legislative intent, a statute adopting a general law is modified by
subsequent modifications of the adopted law. 30 A statute adopting
a specific provision of a general law is not affected by subsequent
modifications of the adopted provision.'
Analogously, regulations are adopted by reference. "Incorporation
by reference" is utilized by the EPA in order to comply fully with
the publication requirements of the APA 3 2 without wasting valuable
space.' 33 The effect of incorporating a regulation by reference is
exactly the same as if that regulation had been printed in full. States
have followed the EPA's lead in adopting regulations by reference,
including their adoption of the EPA's Hazardous Waste Management
Regulations.
The states have adopted the federal RCRA regulations in different
ways and with varying intent. Because the states could promulgate
regulations no less stringent than the federal regulations, 3 4 the states
could either adopt the federal regulations as they existed at that
time, they could adopt the federal regulations as they existed at that
time and could add specific state restrictions, or the states could
completely defer to the federal program. To avoid potential conflict
129. Though each state can set its own precedent,
[t]he general rule of construction ...

is that a statute adopting and referring

to another statute or to some of its provisions adopts and incorporates
the provisions of the earlier statute as they existed at the time of the
adoption, but not subsequent additions or modifications of the statute
adopted, with the result that the operation of the adopting statute will
not be enlarged, limited, or otherwise affected by the subsequent modification or repeal of the adopted statute ....

R.J. Fox, Annotation, Effect of Modification or Repeal of Constitutional or
Statutory Provision Adopted by Reference in Another Provision, 168 A.L.R. 627,

628 (1947).
130. Id.at 632-34.
131. Id.at 632.
132. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988).
133. As it states in the front cover of every volume of the Code of Federal
Regulations, "[t]he legal effect of incorporation by reference is that the material
is treated as if it were published in full in the Federal Register [in accordance
with] [the publication requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act codified
in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)]." The purpose of incorporation by reference is to "substantially
reduce the volume of material published in the Federal Register."
134. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988) concerns authorization of state programs.
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or confusion due to differing state and federal rules, some states
chose to defer to the EPA by adopting regulations identical to the
EPA's and expressly stating their intent to defer to the EPA.",
Other states customized the federal rules prior to adoption. 3 6 If the
state simply wanted equivalent regulations, then the state's mixture
and derived-from rules could be vacated as were the federal rules. 37
If the state wanted its own rules, then the state's mixture and derivedfrom rules may not be affected. 3 8 Thus, the effect of the vacated
federal mixture and derived-from rules will probably vary with the
39
type of adoption language and procedures used by each state.
Assuming that the effect of a regulation "incorporated by
reference" is exactly the same as if the regulation had been printed
on the page, the states basically adopted the federal rules in one
of three ways:1'4 (1) the state rewrote the federal rules, composing
significant portions on its own, then promulgated them in accordance
with standard administrative procedure; 4' (2) the state simply adopted
the federal rules then promulgated them in accordance with standard
administrative procedures; 42 or (3) the state, believing the federal
notice and comment would suffice, deferred to the federal rules,
then promulgated them without the state's standard administrative
43
procedures.
States falling into the first group seem to have the most defensible
mixture and derived-from rules because the states clearly had the
intent to create their own rules apart from the federal rules and
because these states did not bypass standard notice and comment
procedures. States closer to the second group seem to be more
vulnerable because, even though these states restricted their
incorporation to specific versions of the federal regulations, the
apparent legislative intent seems closer to creating a state program
135. Jones, supra note 123, at 20, 22.
136. Jones, supra note 123, at 20, 22.
137. Jones, supra note 123, at 20, 22.
138. Jones, supra note 123, at 20, 22.
139. Jones, supra note 123, at 20, 22.
140. Jones, supra note 123, at 20, 22.
141. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46 (1971), ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 62
(July 1987) (adopting the federal rules by reference, then adding redundant mixture
rule). See also FLA. STAT. ch. 29.403 (1974), FLA. HAz. WASTE RULES tit. 17 (1981).
142. See, e.g., 62 Del. Laws 412 (1980), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 63 (1980)
(reprinting federal rules exactly and limiting incorporation to particular modifications
of the rule). See also GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 391-3-11.01 to -.016 (1980) (adopting
specific portions of 40 C.F.R. (1990) and specific pages of the Federal Register
(1991)).
143. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1003.15 (1986 & Supp. 1992),
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 700 (1981) (deferring completely to the federal program).

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:727

equivalent to the federal program. However, the second group of
states still completed standard notice and comment procedures. The
third group appears to have the least defensible position in that
these states appeared to want no part in developing their own rules.
Because the federal rules were vacated due to insufficient comment
and these states did not complete standard state notice and comment
procedures, these states' rules must also be invalid for the same
reason.
B.

Adoption of Voided Rules

The second issue is whether or not the state could have adopted
a federal rule that was void ab initio. A state's right to incorporate
a federal statute by reference is well established. The rules of
incorporation by reference allow the incorporation of invalid or
"void" laws. 1' "A statute which in part attempts to incorporate
by reference a void statute, although ineffective to revive such statute,
may be effective in so far as the provisions of such reference statute
are new and sound.' '1 45 Therefore, even if the federal mixture and
derived-from rules were void when the states adopted them, the
' 146
state's mixture and derived-from rules are "new and sound.
C.

Goodner's Effect on Arkansas's Mixture and Derived-From
Rules

In analyzing the current status of Arkansas's mixture and derivedfrom rules, one must again consider both sub-issues raised in the
previous section. First, did the subsequent vacature and immediate
reenactment of the federal rule affect Arkansas rules incorporating
the federal rules by reference? Second, assuming that the rule was
void ab initio, does the adoption by Arkansas of a void rule
automatically make the adopting rule void?
Arkansas adopted the federal rules specifically and followed
standard ADPC&E administrative procedures in finalizing the state
rules. 47 Therefore, assuming that the Arkansas rules existed prior
144. See generally 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 70 (1953).
145. Id. at 124 (citing Miggins v. Mallot, 182 A. 333 (Md. 1936)).
146. Id.
147. ADPC&E Regulation 8 (1984). The ADPC&E administrative procedures
codified in Regulation 8 regarding notice and comment differ from the Arkansas
Administrative Procedures Act, 1967 Ark. Acts 434, though insignificantly. Compare
ADPC&E Regulation 8 (1984) with ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-201 (Michie 1987).
For the purposes of this discussion, the procedures will be treated as equivalent.
In any case, the Arkansas Poultry Federation supported a bill before the Arkansas
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to Shell Oil, the rules should exist after Shell Oil because Arkansas
precedent is that the adopting statute is unaffected in absence of
contrary legislative intent.'4 However, if the Arkansas rules were
not valid before Shell Oil, then the EPA's reenactment of the federal
rules would not affect the Arkansas rules any more than the Shell
Oil decision would affect the Arkansas rules. Thus, assuming that
Arkansas intended to create its own rules and not defer to the federal
regulations, the question becomes whether the Arkansas rules were
valid before Shell Oil. In this case, the Arkansas rules may have
been valid before Shell Oil because nothing appears to bar the
adoption of void rules.
The Arkansas Hazardous Waste Management Act 49 contains
language requiring express action to repeal or otherwise modify
existing rules and regulations.' 50 The Arkansas Hazardous Waste
Management Code's language adopted the federal rules very
specifically, 5' and though expressing the requirement of maintaining
a state program equivalent to the federal system, recognized that
52
the EPA regulations would serve merely as "minimum guidelines. "1
legislature (Senate Bill 22) that requires ADPC&E to follow procedures virtually
the same as those required by the Arkansas Administrative Procedures Act in
adopting and changing rules and regulations. See Coalition Wins 1st Fight to
Revamp PC&E, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, January 13, 1993, at IA. Senate
Bill 22 became Act 165 of 1993. See Act of Feb. 18, 1993, No. 165 (or companion
bill 163) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-101 to -106, 8-1-201 to -203, 8-2205, 8-4-102 to -103, 8-4-201 to -205, 8-4-207 to -208, 8-4-213, 8-4-221 to -222
(amending same sections of ARK. CODE ANN. (Michie 1987)) (Michie Supp. 1993)).
148. See Bolar v. Cavaness, 271 Ark. 69, 607 S.W.2d 367 (1980). See also
Howard v. State, 223 Ark. 634, 267 S.W.2d 763 (1954); McLeod v. Commercial
Nat'l Bank, 206 Ark. 1086, 178 S.W.2d 496 (1944).
149. 1979 Ark. Acts 406.
150. The Arkansas code emphatically requires that:
[a]ll existing rules and regulations of the department not inconsistent with
the provisions of this subchapter relating to subjects embraced within this
subchapter shall remain in full force and effect until expressly repealed,
amended, or superseded by the commission, insofar as the rules and
regulations do not conflict with the provisions of this subchapter.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-210(a) (Michie Supp. 1991).
151. ARK. HAZ. WASTE MAI. CODE § 3(a) (1980) (codifying Arkansas Hazardous
Waste Management Act, 1979 Ark. Acts 407). "The following regulations promulgated by the [EPA] are hereby adopted as provisions of this Chapter as though
set forth herein line for line and word for word." Id.
152. Id. at § 3(c).
The Director, annually, after the date of promulgation of any new or
revised federal hazardous waste regulations shall conduct rule making
procedures with reference to this Chapter necessary to maintain a State
Hazardous Waste Management Program equivalent to the federal program.
Such new or revised federal regulations upon the date of their publication
is final rules of the [EPA] shall constitute minimum guidelines to the
Director in formulating rule making proposals to this Chapter, shall not
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The code states expressly that subsequent amendment or modification
of a previously adopted federal rule can only be included as a result
of valid rule-making procedures.' 53 Thus, it appears that Arkansas
did not intend to establish state rules that would remain 15equivalent
4
to the federal rules, at least not without positive action.
The ADPC&E maintains'5 5 that Arkansas's mixture and derivedfrom rules were not vacated with the Shell Oil decision because the
ADPC&E adopted the federal rules by reference under its standard
administrative procedures. By promulgating the regulations under
the standard ADPC&E administrative procedures that provide for
standard public notice and comment, the ADPC&E made up for
its promulgation of the
the EPA's lack of notice and comment15 in
6
rules.
derived-from
and
federal mixture
In contrast, others5 7 argue that the similarity between the
Arkansas and federal rules constitutes evidence that Arkansas intended
to defer to the federal program, meaning that Arkansas rules could
be automatically amended with the federal rules to maintain
equivalence with the federal rules. However, Arkansas did specify
that the federal rules would serve only as "minimum guidelines"
for the "Director's rule making proposals" in addition to incorporating
specific provisions of the adopted rules with language prohibiting
automatic incorporation of modifications to the federal rules. 58 Thus,
there appears little support for the argument that Arkansas intended
to defer to the federal program. On the other hand, if Arkansas
intended to adopt only the specific provisions named in the state
regulations, and there were no federal rules to adopt when Arkansas
adopted its rules by reference because the federal rules were vacated
ab initio, despite the authority allowing adoption of void rules, then
be construed to limit or interfere with the adoption of provisions more
stringent than federal regulations.
Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. Section 3(a) incorporates the definition of hazardous waste contained
in 40 C.F.R. part 261, subparts A, B, C, and D and appendices I, II, III, VII,
VIII, and X of part 261 which includes the federal mixture and derived-from rules
at 40 C.F.R. § 261.3.
155. Telephone Interview with Steve Weaver, General Counsel, ADPC&E (Oct.
15, 1992).
156. Id. ADPC&E agrees with the EPA that the District of Columbia Circuit
meant to apply Shell Oil prospectively only and that the EPA promulgated the
interim rule before the vacated rules were officially invalidated. Id.
157. See Allan Gates, Introduction to the Mixture and Derived-From Rules,
Address Before the Silver Anniversary Meeting of the Arkansas Environmental
Federation (October 21, 1992) (transcript available in Arkansas Environmental
Federation Library).
158. ARK. HAZ. WASTE MAN. CODE § 3(c) (1980).
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Arkansas precedent says that the immediate reissuance of the federal
rule will have no effect on the Arkansas rules, and the Arkansas
rules could be void altogether.' 5 9
Oklahoma adopted its federal rules in substantially the same
manner as Arkansas.' ° In a recent Oklahoma case, Equidae Partners
v. Oklahoma State Department of Health, 16' a state district court
judge also applied Shell Oil retroactively, but extrapolated Shell Oil
to the state's rules that adopted by reference the federal rules to
also invalidate the state's rules retroactively. 62 The court gave summary
judgment for Equidae, dismissing charges supported by the Oklahoma
derived-from rule based on the retroactive application of Shell Oil. 163
The Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) argued that the
state rules were not invalidated because Oklahoma incorporated the
rules according to the standard state administrative procedures and
because the EPA rules were invalidated on procedural grounds only. '64
However, Equidae argued that the state "ha[d] not added its own
agency expertise to the issue and therefore depends solely on the
federal regulations for its validity. 165 The case is currently on appeal
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.' 66
VI.

CURRENT STATUS OF FEDERAL MIXTURE AND DERIVED-FROM
RULES

After Shell Oil, the EPA reinstated the mixture and derivedfrom rules. 67 However, the Office of Management and Budget, with
the support of the Competitiveness Council,'6 required that the EPA
159. Id. at § 4(b).
160. Compare OKLA. HAZ. WASTE MAN. REG. (Okla. Admin. Code) 310-270
(1992) with ARK. HAZ. WASTE MAN. CODE § 3(a) (1980) (regarding "Incorporation
by Reference").

161. No. C-91-532 (Dist. Ct. Washington County, Okla., Jan. 21, 1992), appeal
pending, No.
162. Jones,
163. Jones,
164. Jones,
165. Jones,
Memorandum

79124 (Okla.).
supra note 123, at 22.
supra note 123, at 22.
supra note 123, at 22.
supra note 123, at 22 (quoting Plaintiff Equidae Partners Reply
in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Equidae

Partners v. OSDH, No. C-91-532 (Dist. Ct. Okla. Jan. 16, 1992)).
166. No. C-91-532 (Dist. Ct. Washington County, Okla., decided Jan. 21, 1992),

appeal pending, No. 79124 (Okla.). See also Allan Gates, Environmental Case Law
Update, 1993 Environmental Law Seminar, Arkansas Bar Association, Feb. 26,
1993.
167. 57 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261).
168. See Rudy Abramson, EPA Drops Overhaul of Toxic Rules, WASH. ED./
L.A. Tamms, September 29, 1992, at A8. See also Keith Schneider, Campaign

Concerns Prompt White House to Drop Waste Plan, N.Y. Tmss, September 29,
1992, at Al. The Competitiveness Council, working with the Office of Management

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:727

include a "sunset" provision that eliminated the rules if the EPA
had not promulgated replacement rules by April 28, 1993.169
In response to the reenacted rules' sunset provision, the EPA
proposed a Hazardous Waste Identification Rule on May 20, 199270
as a replacement for the current method of defining hazardous
waste.' 7' This rule was met with overwhelming opposition by the
states' 72 and was not supported competely by industry. The negative
response prompted Congress to pass a measure that removed the
sunset provision and provided the EPA with more time to develop
a response to Shell Oil. 71 Then, on September 28, 1992, the day
and Budget, routinely modified regulations after they were proposed or finalized
by the various administrative agencies with no congressional review or public
comment opportunity given. These activities were first significantly exposed with
the promulgation of the regulations implementing the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990. The Competitiveness Council activities were challenged. See Quayle Hunt,
14 HAZARDOus WASTE NEWS, 295 (Aug. 11, 1992).
169. See Env't Rep. (BNA), Aug. 21, 1992, at 1247. See also Env't Rep. (BNA),
Sept. 11, 1992, at 1382. Reportedly, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
with the support of the Competitiveness Council led by Dan Quayle, pressured the
EPA to insert a "sunset" provision into the interim rule, requiring the permanent
abdication of the mixture and derived-from rules by April 23, 1993, if the EPA
had not proposed an acceptable new hazardous waste identification rule. Depiste
OMB's finest efforts, the EPA withdrew the sunset provision in an exclusive Final
Rule on October 30, 1992. 57 Fed. Reg. 49,278 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.3).
170. See 57 Fed. Reg. 21,450 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261)
(proposed May 20, 1992).
171. See generally Schneider, supra note 168, at Al. The Competitiveness Council
and the Office of Management and Budget "heavily influenced" (a euphemism for
"authored") a fundamental part of the rule-the ECHO or "Characteristic Option."
Schneider, supra note 168, at Al.

172. 57 Fed. Reg. 21,450 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261) (proposed
May 20, 1992) (EPA Comment Docket #F-92-MDFP-FFFF "The HWIR presents
an unwarranted radical change from a preventative program to a reactionary
program." Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology, #F-92-HWEP00229, July 23, 1992. "The solution to pollution is not dilution, yet HWIR would
not adequately control dilution, and opens avenues for gross abuses and severe
environmental damage." Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, #F92-HWEP-00250, July 20, 1992. "After careful review, the Commonwealth of
Kentucky concludes that the proposed rule is ill conceived and lacks even the
appearance of sound scientific judgment." Kentucky Department of Environmental
Protection, #F-92-HWEP-00195, July 17, 1992. "It is unlikely New Jersey will
adopt a RCRA change at the state level in which one in seven drinking water
wells near facilities accepting exempted hazardous waste would become contaminated." New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy, #F-92HWEP-00174, July 17, 1992. "[W]e would suggest that the proposed approaches
... constitute throwing the baby out with the bathwater." Rhode Island Department
of Environmental Management, #F-92-HWEP-00003, June 8, 1992. "Where does

one begin in explaining why Pinocchio is not a real boy? The difficulty of maintaining
nerve synapses in a pointed wooden head?" Hazardous Waste Treatment Council,
#F-92-HWEP-00377, July 24, 1992.).
173. Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development,
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before what appeared might be an extremely embarrassing press
conference planned by opponents of the rule, 7 4 the EPA issued a
press release stating that they would completely withdraw the proposed rule. 75 The EPA promised to "convene a group of interested
parties from environmental groups, industry, and the states to solicit
their input" in order to develop a more adequate rule. 76 However,
the EPA did not withdraw the proposed rule until October 30,
1992.1 7 7 On that day, the EPA finally issued its deletion of the
"sunset" provision that required the replacement rule to be finalized
by April 1993, in response to the law passed by Congress. 78
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Goodner Bros.
Aircraft7 9 was the first retroactive application of the District of
Columbia Circuit's decision to vacate the mixture and derived-from
rules in Shell Oil.180 The effect of the Eighth Circuit's decision was
and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. 102-389, 106 Stat.
1571, 1602-03 (1992). On September 8, 1992, members of the United States Senate
(led by John Chafee, (R-R.I.), ranking minority member of the Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee, Max Baucus (D-S.D.), chair of the Environment
and Public Works Subcommittee on the Environment, and David Durenburger (RMinn.)) passed by voice vote an amendment to the HUD and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Bill that addressed the April 1993 "sunset" provision inserted by
OMB in the reinstatement of the mixture and derived-from rules. With this vote,
the Senate agreed to eliminate the sunset provision; prohibited the EPA from acting
on the proposed unpopular replacement to the mixture and derived-from rules, the
Hazardous Waste Identification Rule (HWIR), until October 1, 1993; and moved
the OMB's April 23, 1993, deadline for HWIR back to October 1, 1994. Id.
174. See Schneider, supra note 168, at Al. See also Abramson, supra note 168,
at A8; Groups Say EPA Withdrew Waste Rule To Avoid Election- Year Criticism,
BNA, Sept. 30, 1992, at 190.
175. EPA Press Release, EPA Withdraws Hazardous Waste Identification Proposal, ENVTL. NEWS, Sept. 28, 1992.
176. Id. The EPA has followed through with its "roundtable discussion" concerning modification of the hazardous waste and derived-from rules. The first such
discussion occurred on January 5, 1993, in Washington, D.C. Well over one hundred
parties attended. The group determined that the first priorities to be addressed
included contaminated media (as opposed to process waste) and treatment residues.
The group met again on February 4 and 5, 1993. Telephone Interview with David
Case, Chief Counsel, Hazardous Waste Treatment Council (Jan. 12, 1993). See
also Meeting Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,376 (1992) and Meeting Notice, 58 Fed. Reg.
6,121 (1993).
177. 57 Fed. Reg. 49,280 (1992) (notice of withdrawal of proposed rule).
178. 57 Fed. Reg. 49,278 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.3). Newly
elected President William Jefferson Clinton abolished the Competitiveness Council
as one of his first acts of his first term as President. See Martha L. Noble, ClintonGore Administration Environmental Strategies, 1993 Environmental Law Seminar,
Arkansas Bar Association, Feb. 26, 1993.
179. 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992).
180. 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See Hanke, supra note 1, at 17.
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to remove the mixture rule that served as the basis in part for
convictions relied on by the jury in the trial court, as if the mixture
rule never existed. 8' The case was remanded in part to the trial
court to retry these convictions without reliance on the mixture
rule.1 2 The Eighth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether Arkansas
mixture and derived-from rules, adopted by referencing the federal
rules, were rendered invalid. 183 The decision thus leaves the status
of states' mixture and derived-from rules uncertain.
In general, the states' rules may or may not be affected by the
vacature of the federal rules depending on the intent of the states
in adopting their rules and the procedures used to adopt them. States
that adopted a modified or more strict version of the federal rules
with standard notice and comment procedures seem to have the
most defensible mixture and derived-from rules because the states
clearly had the intent to create their own rules apart from the federal
rules, and they also complied with the requirements of the APA.
States that adopted only specific amendments of the federal rules
did indeed limit the incorporated rules to the rules that existed at
that time, but the states did not individualize the rules, thereby
leaving an opening for the argument that the state actually deferred
to the federal program. States that adopted the equivalent federal
rules intending to maintain equivalent federal and state programs,
but then failing to satisfy the states' standard notice and comment
procedures in finalizing the rules, do not appear to currently have
mixture and derived-from rules to enforce.1' 4
Mary Ellen Henry

181. See Goodner Bros., 966 F.2d at 385.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Jones, supra note 123, at 20, 22.

